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In 1928, the irrigation engineer Alexander Telford set out to survey Tangan-
yika’s Rufiji and Kilombero valleys, a region many believed held the terri-
tory’s most promising sites for agricultural development (fig. 1).1 Traveling
via boat, motorized lorry, and most often by foot, Telford recorded the
soils, waterways, and people he encountered. The region’s “well-cultivated
[and] carefully laid out and tended” farms, he argued, were evidence of res-
idents’ environmental knowledge and agricultural skills. The Rufiji River
was more of a challenge, being “very irregular in places, of constantly vary-
ing width and depth [and] unstable.”2 He concluded that more geographi-
cal surveys were needed prior to spending large sums on irrigation or river-
improvement projects. Following World War II, the colonial government
turned to international development agencies for assistance in gathering
this data. From 1954 to 1960, experts from the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) traversed the region’s few passable roads
in four-wheel-drive vehicles and made repeated flights over the basin, using
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1. In 1885, Tanzania became part of German East Africa. In 1919, Great Britain was
granted a League of Nations mandate over the colony; at that time, the colony became
the Territory of Tanganyika. On 23 April 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined to form
the United Republic of Tanzania.
2. A. M. Telford, Report on the Development of the Rufiji and Kilombero Valley (Lon-
don, 1929), 1–5, 35.
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FIG. 1 Tanzania’s main waterways and lakes. (Map by David Castro, reproduced
with permission.)
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the latest photogrammetric equipment available to photograph the area.
The picture they constructed stands in sharp contrast to earlier surveys
(1919–45). To the FAO experts, the basin’s farming systems were “irregular”
and in need of standardization.3 Its waterways, however, offered more pos-
sibilities. Where colonial surveyors plodded through muddy fields and
measured success in terms of bags of rice and bundles of cotton, the FAO
experts viewed the region from above, conceptualizing the basin’s snaking
waterways as potential megawatts of electricity.
This article examines the forces that shaped both the collection and use
of geographical data for hydropower projects in Tanzania’s Rufiji Basin.
Some scholars have argued that, in the rush to extract profits from African
territories, colonial planners worked with inadequate data, creating proj-
ects that were inappropriate to African environments and agricultural sys-
tems.4 The case considered here suggests a more complex story. In the
basin, colonial engineers attempted to understand the region’s ecology
prior to the implementation of large-scale irrigation and hydropower proj-
ects. Their surveys included detailed discussions of local production sys-
tems and environments and, in some cases, accurately foresaw the chal-
lenges of damming in the basin. The priorities of development institutions
and the Tanzanian government led to the dismissal of this information in
favor of the later studies of international development consultants. As the
actors changed so did the setting; increasingly, knowledge of the basin was
formulated outside of the region, with little input from residents.
The history of development in the Rufiji Basin contributes to our under-
standing of the relationship between knowledge production and develop-
ment in Africa. While colonial agents drew upon African environmental
knowledge and agricultural practices in their attempts at economic and
social transformation, postcolonial development experts have often devalued
such knowledge.5 Recent scholarship highlights the difference between
Western knowledge and indigenous knowledge and the power relations be-
tween them. James Scott argues that it is faith in science and technology and
a commitment to “high modernism” that make the state unwilling to recog-
nize the value of indigenous knowledge, while Christophe Bonneuil con-
3. Food and Agriculture Organization, The Rufiji Basin, Tanganyika: Report to the
Government of Tanganyika on the Preliminary Reconnaissance Survey of the Rufiji Basin
(Rome, 1961), 45.
4. For example, see Alan Wood, The Groundnut Affair (London, 1950). For a post-
colonial case study, see David C. Cole and Richard Huntington, Between a Swamp and a
Hard Place: Development Challenges in Remote Rural Africa (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).
5. Richard H. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens,
and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600s–1860 (Cambridge, 1995); Monica van Beu-
sekom, Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du
Niger, 1920–1960 (Oxford, 2002); and Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert:
Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens, Ohio,
2007).
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tends that in the late colonial and early postcolonial period in Africa, devalu-
ing indigenous knowledge was “an intrinsic element in the affirmation of the
state, its institutions, and its agents.”6 Similarly, James Ferguson demon-
strates that a shared language and attitude toward development led World
Bank experts in Lesotho to define the country in ways that justified the inter-
vention proposed, in a manner that often disregarded local knowledge.7
Arun Agrawal has challenged the binary classification of Western versus in-
digenous knowledge, arguing that “it makes much more sense to talk about
multiple domains and types of knowledge, with differing logics and episte-
mologies.”8 This article further blurs the distinction between knowledge sys-
tems by showing how some “outsiders”—men working within a colonial
model or later foreign and urban-based researchers and planners—produced
a type of local environmental knowledge. Although paternalism often influ-
enced their relationship with basin residents, long stays in the region and
their surveying techniques had instilled in these men sensitivity to the inter-
play between the basin’s people and waterscape.
Studies of African rivers have focused on the centrality of water to the
social, political, and agricultural development of the continent.9 The process
of transforming these rivers from free-flowing waterways into regulated,
hydropower-producing systems—what the American historian Richard
White refers to as “rationalizing the river”—has received little attention.10
6. James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Con-
dition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn., 1998); Christophe Bonneuil, “Development as
Experiment: Science and State Building in Late Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 1930–
1970,” in Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise, ed. Roy MacLeod (Chi-
cago, 2000), 258–81. For more on the character of indigenous knowledge, see Roy C.
Dudgeon and Fikret Berkes, “Local Understandings of the Land: Traditional Ecological
Knowledge and Indigenous Knowledge,” in Nature across Cultures: Views of Nature and
the Environment in Non-Western Cultures, ed. Helaine Selin (Dordrecht, 2003), 75. For
the relationship of indigenous knowledge to development, see David Brokensha, D. M.
Warren, and OswaldWerner, eds., Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Development (Lan-
ham, Md., 1980); Paul Sillitoe, “The Development of Indigenous Knowledge: A New Ap-
plied Anthropology,” Current Anthropology 39 (1998): 223–52; and Elisabeth Croll and
David Parkin, eds., Bush Base: Forest Farm Culture, Environment, and Development (Lon-
don, 1992).
7. James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis, 1994).
8. Arun Agrawal, “Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge: Some Critical Comments,”
Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor 3 (1995): 5.
9. See Robert Collins, The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal,
1900–1988 (Oxford, 1990); Robert Harms,Games against Nature: An Eco-cultural History
of the Nunu of Equatorial Africa (Cambridge, 1987); W. M. Adams, Wasting the Rain:
Rivers, People, and Planning in Africa (Minneapolis, 1992); Elizabeth Colson, The Social
Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement upon the Gwembe
Tonga (Manchester, 1971); David Gordon, Nachituti’s Gift: Economy, Society, and Envi-
ronment in Central Africa (Madison, Wisc., 2006).
10. Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York, 1995), 76. On river develop-
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With the exception of Moses Chikowero’s recent work on colonial Zimbab-
we, even less attention has been devoted to the development of Africa’s elec-
tricity systems.11 In Tanzania, where hydropower dams supply over 60
percent of electricity consumed, recurring droughts since the 1990s and bio-
diversity concerns have decreased the amount of water available for power
production, leading to the need for electricity rationing and the renewed call
for the construction of hydropower dams. An examination of development
planning in the Rufiji Basin offers scholars, policy makers, and development
practitioners a historical understanding of Tanzania’s electricity system.12
Based on archival and fieldwork conducted in Tanzania and Sweden,
this article uses colonial records, geographical surveys, development re-
ports, and interviews to explore the different ways people have understood
the basin’s waterways and the factors that have led to the privileging of cer-
tain perspectives over others. To engineers, development consultants, and
government planners, the Rufiji Basin’s waterways offered the means for
hydropower development in Tanzania. Between 1945 and 1985, interna-
tional development experts conducted a series of geographical studies of
the basin. While this data was detached in many ways from the realities of
the basin’s ecology and offered limited data on stream flow, the pressure to
translate proposed dam plans into concrete structures led planners to deem
it sufficient. The shifting of the setting of knowledge construction from the
fields and riverbanks of the basin to distant planning offices did not lead to
projects based on better scientific knowledge, but set the stage for Tanzan-
ia’s current electricity problems.
ment in the United States, see Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the
Growth of the American West (New York, 1985); Norris Hundley, The Great Thirst: Cali-
fornians and Water, 1770s–1990s (Berkeley, Calif., 1992); Theodore Steinberg,Nature In-
corporated: Industrialization and theWaters of New England (Cambridge, 1991); David E.
Nye, “Remaking a ‘Natural Menace’: Engineering the Colorado River,” in Technologies of
Landscape: From Reaping to Recycling, ed. David E. Nye (Amherst, Mass., 1999); and
Donald J. Pisani, Water and American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National
Water Policy, and the West, 1902–1935 (Berkeley, Calif., 2002).
11. Moses Chikowero, “Subalternating Currents: Electrification and Power Politics
in Bulawayo, Colonial Zimbabwe, 1894–1939,” Journal of Southern African Studies 33, no.
2 (2007): 287–306.
12. Between 1991 and 1995, Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish development assis-
tance funded the construction of a 2x33 megawatt power plant on the Pangani River,
downstream of the existing Pangani hydropower station. In 1995, work started on the
180 megawatt lower Kihansi hydropower project (with a future total potential of 300
megawatts); the plant went online in December 1999. Other energy sources under devel-
opment include the Songo Songo, Mtwara Region, and Mnazi Bay gas projects. See Sten
Lööf, Preparatory Desk-Study for the Evaluation of the Swedish Support to Tanzania’s
Power Sector (Stockholm, 1996), 7f; and Björn Kjellström et al., Rural Electrification in
Tanzania: Past Experiences, New Approaches (Stockholm, 1992).
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Development and Damming in Britain’s African Colonies
The term development has taken on a wide range of meanings: it can
refer to the process of economic growth, industrialization, improvement of
the quality of life, or poverty reduction. During the colonial era in Africa
(approximately from the 1880s through the 1970s), administrators believed
that through the application of science, technology, and rational planning
techniques, a “primitive” colonial economy could be managed to support
both its own needs and those of the colonizing nation, benefiting both.13
Britain began promoting colonial development during the 1890s, with its
colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, asserting in 1895 that it was “not
enough to occupy certain great spaces of the world’s surface unless you can
make the best of them, unless you are willing to develop them.”He called on
Britain to use its capital and credit “to create an instrument of trade” in the
colonies.14 Under Chamberlain’s leadership, Britain issued loans for infra-
structure development in its colonies, including, for example, the construc-
tion of roads, wharves, and railways in theWest Indies, Cyprus, Uganda, and
Sierra Leone. After World War I, these efforts increased. In 1929, the British
Parliament passed the first Colonial Development Act, which provided £1
million annually to support development projects in Britain’s colonies. In
1940 and 1946, Parliament passed new acts that increased funding for colo-
nial development to £5 million and then £12 million per year.15
With this mandate, colonial administrations assumed an intervention-
ist attitude toward African agricultural production and social welfare. Fears
of economic recession, soil erosion, overpopulation, and drought con-
vinced administrators to discard the more hands-off approach they had
practiced earlier.16 Following World War II, administrators expanded their
scope, worrying about increasing urbanization and the reintegration of
former soldiers into rural life. In Tanganyika, colonial administrators at-
13. Ferguson (n. 7 above), 15. Many anthropologists have addressed the issue of
development and modernization from a variety of perspectives. Examples include Nor-
man Long, An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development (Boulder, Colo., 1977);
Brokensha, Warren, and Werner (n. 6 above); Mark Hobart, ed., An Anthropological
Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance (London, 1993); Alan Hoben,“Anthro-
pologists and Development,” Annual Review of Anthropology 11 (1982): 349–75; and
A. F. Robertson, People and the State: An Anthropology of Planned Development (Cam-
bridge, 1984).
14. Times (London), 1 April 1895, as quoted in Robert V. Kubicek, The Adminis-
tration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office (Durham, N.C., 1969),
68, 71–74.
15. Ibid., 71–74; J. D. Fage, A History of Africa, 3rd ed. (London, 1995), 422.
16. David Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The
Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa during the 1930s,” African Affairs 83
(1984): 321–43. For a discussion of the spread of settlement schemes, see Bonneuil (n. 6
above), 258–81.
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tempted to foster economic growth and stave off demands for independ-
ence by embarking on extensive programs to improve village life that in-
cluded, among other projects, building water supplies, roads, and native
administration buildings, implementing soil-conservation programs, and
forming cooperative societies for marketing agricultural produce.17
Nations without formal colonies nevertheless shared an interest in
developing the world’s poorer regions. The economic instability and global
conflicts of the 1930s and 1940s produced a renewed commitment on the
part of Western nations to the pursuit of political stability through social
and economic betterment. Political, cultural, and ideological differences
gave way, in part, to an international coalition united by a belief in the abil-
ity of modern science and technology to improve livelihoods and maintain
global peace. Norris Dodd, the director-general of the FAO from 1948 to
1953, wrote in 1955:
These people [FAO experts] are from all parts of the world. They
have profoundly different ethnic, cultural, religious, social, political,
and economic backgrounds. They speak many different languages.
But also they all speak the same language of science and technology
and share the same dream of human advancement. They are a gal-
lant company, growing in numbers and influence.18
Agreement over the importance of development and the path to be taken
led to the formation of numerous institutions, including the World Bank
(1944), the International Monetary Fund (1944), the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (1945), and the FAO (1945).
These institutions assumed the responsibility of channeling technical and
financial resources from wealthier nations to their poorer counterparts.19
Economic growth was not a goal held only by colonial planners and for-
eign experts; African elites also shared the dream of development. Following
political independence, many of Africa’s leaders pursued developmentalist
agendas similar to those of their colonial predecessors.20 Both groups
17. Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 274/2/1/782, “Letter to Provincial
Commissioners and District Commissioners from the Provincial Office,” Dar es Salaam,
3 September 1943.
18. Norris Dodd, in “Preface” to Gove Hambidge, Story of FAO (New York, 1955), iii.
19. This belief in science was obviously not a new occurrence in the post–WorldWar
II era. For a discussion of how it affected interactions between Europeans and non-West-
ern peoples in other periods, see Michael Adas,Machines as the Measure of Men: Science,
Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); and MacLeod,
Nature and Empire (n. 6 above). For a discussion of the resurgence of internationalism
during the 1940s, see Amy L. S. Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank,
Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World,
1945–1965 (Kent, Ohio, 2004).
20. Frederick Cooper,“Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Devel-
opment Concept,” in International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the
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viewed waterways as vital to the promotion of economic growth.While the
commitment to river development did not falter, what did change was the
definition of what that development should look like. Colonial administra-
tors valued Africa’s waterways for their ability to facilitate navigation and
provide irrigation water.21 With the ascendance of scientific development in
the late 1940s, new ideals came into play; by the mid-1950s, Western and
non-Western planners alike agreed that efficiently developed rivers could
catalyze national economic development. From the 1960s on, harnessing
rivers to support agricultural expansion and produce electricity to fuel
industrial growth became a top priority for African planners.22
Throughout the twentieth century, North American and European
nations had demonstrated how controlled rivers could form the founda-
tion for a nation’s economic transformation, making them symbols of
“modernity.” African leaders also recognized the value of dams to control
floods, irrigate crops, facilitate navigation, and, most important in postwar
Africa, produce hydropower. Beyond supplying concrete evidence of mod-
ern development, however, dams were also reflections of state power. Cold
war politics heightened the importance of hydropower dams and other
large, capital-intensive projects in Africa. Leaders such as Gamal Abdel
Nasser in Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Julius Nyerere in Tan-
zania sought development assistance from all sides of the political divide to
fund such projects. After the United States and Britain withdrew funding
for the Aswan High Dam in 1956, Nasser turned to the Soviet government,
which ended up funding a third of the construction costs.23 Other African
leaders took note. Nkrumah leveraged Soviet interest in the Volta River
Project to solidify American and British financial commitments, warning
that “either we shall modernize with your interests and support—or we
shall be compelled to turn elsewhere.”24
Tanzanian president Nyerere also recognized the symbolic and eco-
History and Politics of Knowledge, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley,
Calif., 1997), 64–92; and Bonneuil, 258–81.
21. In Britain’s African colonies, the key example of this type of development was
the Gezira Scheme and the Jonglei Canal in the Sudan; see Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A
Story of Development in the Sudan (London, 1959), and Collins, The Waters of the Nile
(n. 9 above).
22. By 1956, the United Nations designated river development as a key to economic
development. See L. A. Teclaff, The River Basin in History and Law (The Hague, 1967),
123; Adams (n. 9 above), 100–154.
23. Jeremy Collins, “Ghana, the Congo Crisis, and the Volta River Project: Kwame
Nkrumah and the Cold War in Africa” (M. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1995).
24. The desire for Western financing ultimately kept Ghana from accepting Soviet
support for the Volta River Project; however, in 1961, the USSR agreed to finance a dam
at Bui on the Black Volta River. See Kwame Nkrumah, quoted in Collins, “Ghana, the
Congo Crisis, and the Volta River Project,” 49; and the Ghana National Archives (here-
after GNA), SC/BAA/206, October 1962.
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25. “Mwalimu Opens Hydro-electric Plant,”News Review, January 1965.
26. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Rufiji Basin: Land
andWater Resource Development Plan and Potential,” paper prepared for USAID by the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 2, held in the private archive of
Kjell Havnevik.
27. Susan Charnley, “Environmentally Displaced Peoples and the Cascade Effect:
Lessons from Tanzania,”Human Ecology 4 (1997): 593–618.
28. Interview with Salumu Likindi and Juma Bogobogo, Utete, Tanzania, 18 Febru-
ary 2001. Other informants echoed this sentiment.
29. Interview with Nyambonde Masafi, Utete, Tanzania, 17 February 2001.
nomic importance of hydropower dams. At the commissioning of the Hale
hydroelectric plant in 1965, he proclaimed: “Schemes such as this one are
in fact the bricks and mortar evidence of the revolution which our country
is deliberately and purposefully undergoing. It represents the application of
science to the needs of the people.”25 Nyerere requested assistance from
multiple international-aid organizations to fund hydropower dams on the
waterways of the Rufiji Basin.
The Rufiji Basin
To postwar planners, the Rufiji Basin held great promise for develop-
ment.26 Stretching over 600 kilometers from the Indian Ocean to the bor-
der with Malawi and Zambia, the basin covers 177,420 square kilometers,
one-fifth of Tanzania’s total area. In the upper basin, several rivers flowing
from the southern highlands water the Usangu Plains, forming the Great
Ruaha. Well suited for irrigated cultivation and pastoral activities, the area
has long attracted immigrants from nearby regions, Europe, and Iran. To-
day, between thirty and forty different ethnic groups live in the region, in-
cluding agriculturalists such as the Wasangu and pastoralists such as the
Wasukuma and Maasai.27 The Great Ruaha River flows through the Pawaga
Plains and eventually meets the Rufiji River. The largest river in Tanzania,
the Rufiji has an average annual flow of 900 cubic meters per second and
gives rise to a large delta. Farmers take advantage of the alluvial soils to cul-
tivate rice, maize, and cotton, and residents also fish the region’s numerous
waterways and lakes. The river, along with the widespread adherence to
Islam, unifies the ethnic groups living within its sphere of influence. Many
residents and outsiders refer to the population simply as the “Warufiji.” As
one resident explained, “The word Rufiji means all the people who live in
areas affected by the river.”28
Rufiji residents understand the Rufiji as a beneficial, potentially dan-
gerous, and, above all, changing force of nature. In addition to serving as
important water sources, transportation byways, and fisheries, the basin’s
waterways hold spiritual significance. To Utete resident Nyambonde Mas-
afi, the rains and springs that provide the river “were probably caused by
mashetani [spirits].”29 Such mashetani affect people’s daily lives; for exam-
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30. Interview with Juma Bogobogo, Utete, Tanzania, 18 February 2001. Informants
used the term mashetani to refer to spirits in general. For a discussion of the different
types of spirits and deities in the region, see T. O. Beidelman, The Matrilineal Peoples of
Eastern Tanzania (London, 1967), and C. G. K. Gwassa, “Kinjikitile and the Ideology of
Maji Maji,” in The Historical Study of African Religion, ed. T. O. Ranger and I. N. Kimam-
bo (Berkeley, Calif., 1972), 202–17.
31. For a detailed discussion of Rufiji agriculture, see Han Bantje, “The Rufiji
Agricultural System: Impact of Rainfall, Floods, and Settlement,” Bureau of Resource
Assessment and Land Use Planning (hereafter BRALUP) Research Paper No. 62 (Dar es
Salaam, 1979); and David Jack, “The Agriculture of Rufiji District: A Review,” TNA,
1957, 7.
32. Bantje, 3–4, 22; Audun Sandberg, “Socio-economic Survey of Lower Rufiji Flood
Plain, Part I: Rufiji Delta Agricultural System,” BRALUP Research Paper No. 34 (Dar es
Salaam, 1974); and H. Marsland, “Mlau Cultivation in the Rufiji Valley,” Tanganyika
Notes and Records 5 (1938): 56. This information was confirmed through discussions
with informants.
ple, in the lower Rufiji, a person who disobeys local norms, such as going to
the river with black objects or using obscene language near the river, can in-
cur the wrath of these mashetani.30
In the Rufiji floodplain, agricultural success depends on rainfall and
flooding, both of which are highly unpredictable. In a good year, the region
experiences two wet seasons: the short rains that begin in October/Novem-
ber, and the long rains between February/March and May/June. The
amount and duration of rain varies, with inland areas receiving substan-
tially less than coastal areas. The failure of either rainy season can lead to
crop failure. Floods likewise play a crucial role, because they deposit the al-
luvium that helps maintain soil fertility. If the preferred soil type (mbarag-
ilwa) does not receive a flood at least once every three years, crop yields can
decline by as much as 50 percent. High or ill-timed floods can destroy
crops, livestock, property, and even occasionally kill people. Early floods
disrupt the planting cycle, often arriving before farmers have finished
preparing their fields.31
Floodplain residents respond by diversifying production. They have
developed a system that uses both wet and dry seasons, as well as the fertile
soils of the floodplain and the poorer soils of higher elevations, to provide
security in years of high or insufficient flooding, low rainfall, or both.
Farmers draw on their knowledge of the variable climate and soil condi-
tions and planting times to choose from over thirty-two varieties of rice to
suit local microenvironments.32 Agriculture in the delta is similar, although
here, tidal fluctuations rather than the annual floods regulate farming prac-
tices. The absorption of water into the upstream floodplain, lakes, and wet-
lands slows the floodwater, diminishing the harmful effects felt in the delta.
Tides and annual floods constantly transform the delta waterscape. Ronald
de la Barker, a New Zealand–born hippo hunter who lived in the region
during the 1930s and 1940s, described the delta’s dynamism: “Every spate
[flood] season makes remarkable changes in both the river and delta. Little
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33. Ronald de la Barker, “The Delta of the Rufiji River,” Tanganyika Notes and
Records 2 (1936): 1.
34. For a description of the mangrove trade, see Erik Gilbert,Dhows and the Colon-
ial Economy of Zanzibar, 1860–1970 (Athens, Ohio, 2004).
35. J. F. Elton, Travels and Researches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern and
Central Africa (London, 1879), 97. This was a common trope in tropical colonies as
Europeans were often confronted with advanced indigenous production systems. For a
discussion of how Europeans explained and presented non-Western achievements, see
S. H. Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native (London, 1977), and Adas (n. 19 above).
36. Elton, 331. H. B. Cotterill was connected to the Scottish mission at Lake Nyasa.
During their travels together, Elton fell ill and died. Cotterill returned to the coast with
Elton’s journals from the journey, which he later edited and published. See Royal Geo-
graphical Society, “Obituary: H. B. Cotterill,”Geographical Journal (1925): 86–87.
37.William Beardall, “Exploration of the Rufiji River under the Orders of the Sultan
of Zanzibar,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geog-
raphy (London, 1881), 642.
38. Clement Gillman, “A Reconnaissance of the Hydrology of Tanganyika Territory
bays become sandbanks and are sometimes soon covered with vegetation,
and deep channels are scoured out elsewhere. On each island of the delta
the sea is encroaching at one place and receding at another.”33 Delta farm-
ers also utilize the region’s microenvironments: in the sandy soils of the
mangrove forests and delta islands, they plant millet, maize, rice, cassava,
cowpeas, and cotton; on the adjacent higher lands, they grow coconut trees
for copra, coconut oil, and materials for mat-making; and along the banks
of the rivers and in the valleys, they grow tomatoes, pumpkins, tobacco, and
sugarcane and fish in the nearby streams and ocean.34
Mapping the Rufiji Basin, 1879–1949
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the agricultural potential of the
Rufiji Basin drew the attention of European visitors. James Elton, British
consul at Mozambique, described the river’s floodplain during the 1870s as
“a land of plenty.”35 Reaching the southern highlands, Elton and his co-trav-
eler Henry Cotterill described the landscape as “the Garden of Africa.”
“Cattle abound,” Elton wrote, “flats, hillsides, and mountain sides are under
cultivation and serrated with hedgerows, and pathways to high elevations,
the main valleys being appropriated for grazing.”36 William Beardall’s 1880–
81 exploration of the Rufiji River for the sultan of Zanzibar described the
floodplain as “very fertile, and grows splendid crops of rice, which is the
principal grain cultivated.”37 Such reports piqued the interest of the German
East African government, which undertook a series of technical investiga-
tions of the Rufiji and Kilombero rivers in 1904, 1907, 1909, and 1911. The
German administration concerned itself with the navigational possibilities
of the Rufiji River and an irrigation scheme in the Kilombero Valley. Ulti-
mately, the Germans decided that a railroad was more economical and
hence turned their attention away from river transport.38
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in Its Geographical Settings,”Water Consultant’s Report No. 6 (Dar es Salaam, 1943), 97;
Food and Agriculture Organization (n. 3 above), 5; and Kjell J. Havnevik, Tanzania: The
Limits to Development from Above (Motala, Sweden, 1993), 263.
39. Telford (n. 2 above), 36. On European attitudes toward African labor patterns,
see Valentin Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of
Knowledge (Bloomington, Ind., 1988).
40. Telford, 20.
41. Ibid., 18.
42. As the chief engineer of Tanganyika Railways, Gillman conducted an extensive
reconnaissance survey of the southern highlands for a possible rail line. Because of fail-
ing health, Gillman curtailed many field visits for the water survey and relied on his ex-
tensive field notes collected during previous trips throughout the territory. This resulted
in an abbreviated report. For a detailed discussion of Gillman’s life, see B. S. Hoyle, Gill-
man of Tanganyika, 1882–1946: The Life and Work of a Pioneer Geographer (Hampshire,
UK, 1987).
The transfer of Tanganyika from German to British control following
World War I halted investigations of the Rufiji Basin until the late 1920s,
when the colonial administration contracted Alexander Telford, an irriga-
tion engineer and chief of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, to conduct a
study of both the Rufiji and Kilombero valleys. Influenced by his experience
in the Sudan, Telford included vivid descriptions of the basin’s environment,
agricultural systems, and inhabitants alongside soil classification and cross-
sections of the river. He emphasized the relationship between land use and
social practice. Where previous visitors often portrayed farmers as lazy,
Telford found farmers’ attitude toward labor justified: “It has been suggested
that their [farmers’] laziness may be due to diseases such as hookworm,” he
wrote, “but one of the main reasons is undoubtedly the prodigality of
nature, which renders a very prolific return for next to no work.”39
Telford’s study exemplifies the kind of knowledge colonial engineers
obtained about basin landscapes through their survey methods. He de-
scribed the environment in active terms, evoking images of the area and its
people as agents in their own development. The Rufiji River, Telford de-
scribed, “originally chose a depression to flow through,” his anthropomor-
phism emphasizing the river’s independent character.40 Traveling over a
thousand miles during the course of his study (500 miles by foot), he came
into close contact with basin communities. His understanding of the capri-
ciousness of the basin’s waterways, based on observations and discussions
with local inhabitants, led him to recommend that the colonial government
postpone construction of bunds or embankments along the river. His
knowledge of agricultural and social systems led him to argue that irriga-
tion was unnecessary, as “in most years there is sufficient rainfall to produce
at least one food crop or cotton crop successfully.”41
Between 1938 and 1940, Clement Gillman, formerly the chief engineer
of Tanganyika Railways and at the time the territorial water consultant,
completed the next major survey of the basin.42 Like Telford, he worked
within the British colonial establishment, bringing with him over four
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45. Ibid., 97–99. For a discussion of colonial science and Western views on indige-
nous people’s “misuse” of land as a cause for soil degradation, see Christopher A. Conte,
“Colonial Science and Ecological Change: Tanzania’s Mlalo Basin, 1888–1946,” Environ-
mental History 4 (1999): 220–44.
46. Other studies on the basin were published in the journal Tanganyika Notes and
decades of experience in the territory. Gillman linked water and economic
development directly in a 1943 report:
The Administrator and his scientific and technical advisors, singly
or combined . . . will never find a solution for the thousand and one
problems facing them, unless they base their deliberations on Water
which is the fundamental and outstanding aspect of all attempts to
develop a semi-arid country and to improve the physical, mental
and moral life of its peoples!43
To Gillman, social development required that the colonial administration
understand how to use the territory’s natural resources. Although poor
health and the outbreak of World War II prevented a visit to the region,
Gillman offered cautious comment on its future development potential:
“One is, therefore, forced to the conclusion that large-scale irrigation
schemes should be left severely alone and that in the light of a recent fuller
understanding of the complications of climate, soils, hydrography and
markets the early optimism of the Germans regarding the possibilities of
such schemes can no longer be upheld.”44
Reclamation of the lower Rufiji, Gillman believed, hinged upon the
construction of expensive works, similar to those initiated along the Nile
River, and a program of river gauging for which the staff and financing
were lacking. Although pessimistic about large-scale irrigation schemes,
Gillman was optimistic about the basin’s potential for hydropower produc-
tion, provided that sedimentation levels and agricultural water use were
taken into consideration. His report raised three issues that his successors
would contend with. First, he suggested that the differences between high
and low stream flow in the rivers was so great that power schemes would
have to depend on the “meagre volumes of the latter [water in the low sea-
son] unless very costly and at present wholly unwarrantable projects for
storing part of the high water are resorted to.” Second, he noted that human
“misuse” of the highland vegetation led to larger flood runoff, thus reduc-
ing the permanent discharge. Finally, Gillman believed that the large
amount of silt and sand carried by the rivers necessitated the construction
of sand traps to prevent damage to turbines.45
Telford and Gillman exemplify the wider efforts that colonial engineers
and scientists made to understand the geography and hydrology of the
Rufiji Basin.46 Conducted with limited resources, Telford’s and Gillman’s
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Records. Examples include Barker (n. 33 above), 1–6; Ronald de la Barker, “The Rufiji
River,” Tanganyika Notes and Records 4 (1936): 10–16; Marsland (n. 32 above), 55–59;
and G. M. Stockley, “The Geology of the Rufiji District, Including a Small Portion of
Northern Kilwa District (Matumbi Hills),” Tanganyika Notes and Records 16 (1943):
7–29.
47. Interview with Salumu Likindi, Utete, Tanzania, 18 February 2001. Residents
nicknamed John Young “Yange,” a term that also came to refer to the maize flour given
to residents during food shortages by the colonial government. With the exception of
periodic leaves, Young was stationed in the Rufiji district during the following years:
January 1946 to March 1947, and November 1950 to July 1961.
48. TNA 274 11/8/230, “Letter to Provincial Commissioner for Eastern Province
from Rufiji District Commissioner John Young,” 1951. This correspondence continues
throughout TNA 274 11/8, “Agriculture and Veterinary Crop Campaign,” 1951; TNA
1/2/D, “Letter to All Provincial Commissioners, from the Member for Agriculture and
Natural Resources A. E. Trotman,” 18 June 1954.
studies provided little quantifiable data on the basin; they do, however,
offer insight into how colonial engineers interacted with the basin’s envi-
ronment and populations. Telford focused on the relationship between the
basin’s environment and people, analyzing future development in terms of
the needs of the population. Gillman’s vision included the entirety of Tan-
ganyika’s water resources, with the Rufiji Basin merely one element in the
larger territorial picture.
As temporary visitors to the basin, Telford and Gillman relied heavily
on the knowledge of district officials. Working closely with farmers, many
officials had a detailed understanding of residents’ relationship to their
environments and the logic behind production systems. This knowledge
positioned district officials as local experts. During the 1940s and 1950s,
Rufiji district commissioner John Young interacted with residents on agri-
cultural projects ranging from “Plant More Crops” campaigns to tractor
mechanization programs.47 Working within the variable waterscape, Young
and other officials understood the river’s volatility. Like the residents, they
agreed that the yearly floods were blessings in disguise. However, while
local residents devised strategies to cope with the variations in flooding,
Young and his colleagues proposed to regulate the river by clearing, dredg-
ing, and straightening its main channel or building embankments to pro-
tect adjacent rice fields. Such projects would require an expensive “full in-
vestigation” of the area—an impossible endeavor for the cash-strapped
territorial government.48
Enter the External Experts: The Rufiji Basin Survey, 1952–1961
During the late colonial period, developing the hydrological resources
of the Rufiji Basin became a key goal of planners in Tanganyika. Officials
in Dar es Salaam and London discussed how best to capitalize on the
basin’s potential. In 1950, E. Smith, the director of Tanganyika’s Depart-
05_49.3hoag:03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  7/14/08  12:57 PM  Page 637
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19 December 1950.
50. Food and Agriculture Organization (n. 3 above), 2–4.
51. Ibid., 7; and TNA 257/AN/19/06/A/92, “Extract from Tanganyika Unofficial
Members’ Organization,” 27 July 1954.
52. “Utete Told of Plan to Harness the Rufiji,” Tanganyika Standard, 7 August 1954.
53. TNA 257/AN19/06A/204, “Letter to A. Trotman from Stuart Gillett (TAC),” 11
ment of Water Development, sent the Natural Resources minister a pro-
posal for a six-month exploratory survey of the basin. Such a survey,
viewed by Smith as the first step in constructing a basin-wide development
plan, would include contour mapping, an examination of potential dam
sites, an aerial survey, and the establishment of hydrometric gauging sta-
tions throughout the basin.49
Because the colony lacked both the funds and the personnel to conduct
a comprehensive survey, Tanganyika’s governor, Edward Twining, ap-
proached the director-general of the FAO in 1952 with the survey proposal.
The following year, the FAO contracted Nicholas Simansky, formerly of the
Sudan irrigation department, to investigate the “possibilities for the devel-
opment of irrigated cultivation, and what such development might involve
in works and expenditure.” This included documenting the basin’s cadas-
tral, topographical, and hydrological conditions, investigating potential
sites for storage dams, and calculating construction costs.50 Confronted
with the enormity of the basin during his preliminary investigations,
Simansky narrowed the survey’s geographic focus to what he thought were
the three most promising areas for irrigation development: the floodplain
of the lower Rufiji, the Kilombero Valley, and the Usangu and Pawaga
plains of the Great Ruaha River subcatchment basin.51
In August 1954, Governor Twining announced the start of the Rufiji
Basin Survey (RBS) to over 10,000 residents in the Rufiji district capital of
Utete. Following a performance of the Tanganyika police band, the gover-
nor explained the need for technical control of the Rufiji River. He predicted
that the data gathered by the RBS team would allow the Rufiji floodplain to
become the “veritable Eldorado” that colonial planners envisioned. Gover-
nor Twining concluded his comments by urging residents to offer their as-
sistance to the “many experts and technicians” who would come to learn
about their river.52
The RBS forged a partnership between the colonial administration and
the FAO. From the beginning, the process of collaboration faced difficulties
as actors struggled to keep their priorities and visions for the basin on the
negotiating table. The government argued for the value of hydrometric and
agronomic data; the FAO team prioritized topographical and geological
investigations of potential dam sites. United by their commitment to using
the basin’s resources, they put aside their early differences and signed a for-
mal agreement in 1955.53
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on its priority list, hence decreasing work planned in other areas. In exchange, the FAO
agreed to slow down the pace of the survey and reduce the number of staff from the
colonial government. See TNA 532/22/32/1, “Letter to Member for Agriculture and
Natural Resources Arthur Trotman from A. Smith,” 1 May 1954; and TNA 257/AN/19/
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54. Parastatals were state-owned enterprises set up to facilitate the economic devel-
opment of specific sectors.
55. TNA 257 AN 19/02/A/204, “Letter to Chief Secretary of the Secretariat, Dar es
Salaam, from Ralph Phillips, Acting Director Agricultural Division, FAO, Rome,” 28 July
1955. Other team members came from Australia, Austria, Britain, Canada, France,
Holland, India, Italy, Lebanon, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and Switzerland; see Food
and Agriculture Organization, 6.
56. Food and Agriculture Organization (n. 3 above), 27. The observations of each
were presented in volume 2 of the survey.
57. TNA 532/15/30/676, “Letter to Director of Water Development and Irrigation
Department from Jakob Otnes,” 17 May 1956.
The Rufiji Basin Survey team included members of the FAO, govern-
ment staff, and staff members of the parastatal, the Tanganyika Agricul-
tural Corporation (TAC).54While the TAC coordinated the survey, the FAO
provided the core of the technical team, with the colonial government
recruiting African and European “assistants and subordinates” from within
Tanganyika. Between 1953 and 1960, the FAO contributed from one to
twelve members of a team that included, at its highest count, forty-two
members (not including porters, guides, and hydrometric gauge readers
hired throughout the basin). The team members came from diverse
national backgrounds and had studied in some of the most prestigious
technical colleges of the day; for example, the FAO’s hydrologist, Norwe-
gian Jakob Otnes, had worked as the state hydrologist in Norway and had
undertaken large basin surveys similar to the RBS before being recom-
mended to the FAO by the World Meteorological Office.55
When the FAO team set out to map the Rufiji Basin and its many water-
ways, it needed to determine how much water flowed through the basin’s
rivers. In order to answer this question, the team established sixty-five hy-
drometric stations throughout the basin, in addition to the sixteen set up
during Simansky’s preliminary investigation in 1953.56 Hydrologists then
trained residents to record the daily fluctuations of the basin’s rivers, as the
large size of the basin made it impossible for the team to collect the hydro-
logical and climate data for itself. The FAO team understood that the mem-
bers of the riverine community had an understanding of the basin’s water-
ways. After the high floods of 1956, Otnes wrote to the director of the water
department that “I presume the people living by the Rufiji will be able to
give maximum hight [sic] of thier [sic] villages.”57 Yet the team did not ask
residents about their past experiences of the basin’s waterways; rather, it
asked only about daily changes in stream flow. Most residents did not
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understand what motivated this influx of wazungu (foreigners) into their
villages. As one resident recalled: “The British were relentlessly measuring
the Rufiji River. Why were they doing it? We do not know.”58
Between 1955 and 1960, the basin experienced what the team consid-
ered a low hydrological year (November 1958 to October 1959), as well as
a high hydrological year (November 1955 to October 1956). This allowed
the team to extrapolate the expected flows from the basin’s tributaries in
both low and high flood years, in addition to dry and wet seasons. Pre-
sented in a series of tables, the data showed the wide variation in stream
flow recorded for the basin’s waterways. Such tables and graphs gave plan-
ners a false confidence that they could predict the seasonal fluctuations of
the basin’s rivers. Colonial administrators challenged this confidence as
early as 1955, when they accused Simansky of “putting the cart before the
horse” by starting trial farms based on only one year of stream-flow data.
Stuart Gillett, TAC’s chairman, complained:
To be quite frank I cannot see how he [Simansky] is going to decide
on a policy of water control until we have the information necessary
from the hydrometric records . . . no positive recommendations
regarding water control of the area could be framed until several
years of readings have been recorded and studied.59
Gillett’s concern did not slow down the FAO team. By the end of 1955, it
had established trial farms at Beta, Mtanza, and Ndundu in the Rufiji dis-
trict, as well as at sites in the upper basin. In the end, high flooding in 1956
severely damaged the Mtanza farm, proving Gillett right and questioning
the wisdom of using resources on irrigation projects without more data on
the vacillations of the district’s waterways.60
The FAO team’s methods of collecting data enhanced the growing dis-
tance between planners and the Rufiji ecology. Airplanes made surveying
easier for the team, since more ground could be covered in a day. Flying
meant fewer firsthand encounters with mud, insects, wildlife, and other an-
noyances and dangers. It allowed the FAO team to view the Rufiji without
wading through its many marshes or driving through saturated floodplains.
The team surveyed the environment while being physically separated from
it, and consequently perceived the river as passive and controllable.Working
from a perspective that was inaccessible to most Rufiji residents, the team
thus gained an understanding of the Rufiji ecology on entirely different
kinds of experiences than those of the local people.
The aerial data, displayed on maps drawn in London and Rome (the
headquarters of the FAO) from the survey data, proved remarkably influ-
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Development andWelfare Fund and £207,000 from funds raised through the FAO (Food
and Agriculture Organization [n. 3 above], 8).
ential, codifying the Rufiji in the minds of planners. The FAO constructed
a portrait of the basin with little detailed understanding of the many
microenvironments present within it. Where colonial engineers and sur-
veyors had focused on the circumstances of particular localities, the FAO
sought a quantitative overview of the entire basin and neglected site-spe-
cific descriptions. It dismissed earlier nonquantified data and the observa-
tions of residents, British colonial officials, and surveyors; for example, the
FAO rejected Clement Gillman’s 1940 finding that no major rivers would
lend themselves to large irrigation schemes, as the costs of gauging their
highly variable flows would outweigh the benefits, explicitly noting that his
conclusion was “clearly a mistaken one.”61
In 1961, the FAO team presented a seven-volume study to the now-inde-
pendent government of Tanganyika, providing information on hydrology,
topography, and soil conditions in the basin and the first quantified presen-
tation of the seasonal variation of stream flow for the basin’s main rivers and
tributaries.62 The FAO’s charts, graphs, and tables replaced colonial under-
standings of the basin’s waterscape. Armed with a mere five years’ worth of
data, FAO planners believed themselves amply prepared to construct trial
irrigation projects and plan hydropower dams.
Tanzania’s Boulder Dam: Stiegler’s Gorge, 1961–1985
The Rufiji Basin Survey marked the beginning of the formal planning
of hydropower dams in the basin (see table 1). Throughout the 1960s and
1970s, the Tanzanian government commissioned an additional series of
surveys of the basin. Most of these studies concluded, as had the FAO, that
the answer to the basin’s underdevelopment was better utilization of its
waterways. Although neither the preliminary inquiry nor the subsequent
survey had mentioned the possibility of hydropower generation, a third of
the RBS’s available funds had been devoted to topographical surveys of
potential dam sites. In addition to investigating the basin’s most promising
sites, those of Mtera and Stiegler’s Gorge, the team turned its attention to
eighteen additional sites (six on the Great Ruaha River and twelve on the
upper Kilombero River).63
The FAO team believed that the yearly floods were the major hindrance
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67. Dean E. McHenry Jr., Tanzania’s Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural
Development Strategy (Berkeley, Calif., 1979), 2–4.
to development in the lower Rufiji, and it recommended postponing fur-
ther activities until a large dam at Stiegler’s Gorge was completed to prevent
flooding and permit systematic irrigation.64 The director of water develop-
ment, W. Steele, wrote in 1954 that Simansky “seems to think that there is
great promise in the development of about one million acres under irriga-
tion in the Rufiji Basin, in order to develop which Tanganyika will have to
have its own Boulder Dam.”65 The RBS examination of the lower Rufiji
consisted primarily of topographical and geological studies of Stiegler’s
Gorge. Planners estimated that a dam of 6.4 million acre-feet capacity
would cost £10 million and provide 150 megawatts of power. Simansky
imagined an even larger dam, one capable of holding 18.5 million acre-feet
and producing 400 megawatts of “firm” power.66 With the proper markets,
selling power from Stiegler’s Gorge could provide Tanzania with the rev-
enue to implement other development plans. Stiegler’s Gorge Dam would
harness the waters of the Rufiji River and electrify East Africa.
By 1967, the optimism stemming from Tanzania’s independence had
begun to dissipate. Hoe-based subsistence agriculture, the foundation of
the country’s economy, was declining, resulting in falling agricultural in-
come and increased reliance on foreign assistance.67 Faced with the daunt-
ing challenge of Tanzania’s deteriorating economy, the National Executive
of the Tanganyika African National Union passed the Arusha Declaration
on 29 January 1967. Hailed as the “blueprint for socialism,” the declaration
TABLE 1
HYDROPOWER PLANTS IN TANZANIA REFERENCED IN THIS ARTICLE
Available capacity Date of
Plant (MW) completion
Hale 21 1964





Stiegler’s Gorge 2001 (est.) (not yet built)
Source: Tanesco, “The Power Sector in Tanzania,” ESI Africa 2 (2006): 16.
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cle. See Andrew Coulson, ed., African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience
(Nottingham, UK, 1979); William Redman Duggan, Tanzania and Nyerere: A Study of
Ujamaa and Nationhood (New York, 1976); J. H. Proctor, ed., Building Ujamaa Villages
in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 1974); and Scott (n. 6 above), 223–61. For a discussion of
villagization in the Rufiji district, see Ben Turok, “The Problem of Agency in Tanzania’s
Rural Development: The Rufiji Ujamaa Scheme,” in Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, ed.
Lionel Cliffe (Dar es Salaam, 1975).
70. United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and
Social Development, 1st July, 1969–30th June, 1974: Volume I: General Analysis (Dar es Sa-
laam, 1969), 121.
71. Swedish National Archives, SIDA Archive, Arninge (hereafter SNASA), F1AB
1387–1391 and Tanesco archive, Tanesco: Reports and Accounts, 1964–1971. The British
company Tanesco was established in 1931; in 1964, it became the national utility com-
pany owned by the Tanzanian government. Run of the river dams are usually built on
waterways with consistent stream flow; therefore they do not require adjacent large
reservoirs to produce a steady supply of electricity.
laid out President Julius Nyerere’s commitment to development through
socialism.68 The centerpiece of his program was ujamaa villagization. As
defined by Nyerere, ujamaa was the traditional African way of living and
working together for the good of the entire family. By providing techno-
logical knowledge and establishing communal farms he hoped to expand
these familial values to the village level, thus creating productive, self-
reliant agricultural settlements. Government officials urged (later ordered)
rural residents to either move into existing villages or create new ujamaa
villages. Due to prolonged, high flooding in 1968, the Rufiji floodplain be-
came the first area to undergo government-mandated villagization.69 The
floods provided justification for both the FAO’s recommendations and the
government’s resettlement program.
Socialist agriculture was only one aspect of Nyerere’s economic-devel-
opment strategy; industrial development was another. Tanzania’s Second
Five-Year Plan emphasized the importance of electricity for national devel-
opment.70 In 1964 and 1969, respectively, the Tanzanian national utility
(Tanesco) completed the Hale hydroelectric plant on the Pangani River and
the Nyumba ya Mungu Dam in the Kilimanjaro region. Both dams were
small and gravity-driven, allowing water use downstream and requiring no
large dams or reservoirs. Yet they produced little power: the Nyumba ya
Mungu provided only 8 megawatts of installed capacity.71
Many planners believed that the Stiegler’s Gorge Dam would provide
electricity for the nation’s industrial and urban development. To make it a
reality, the Tanzanian government enlisted the aid of international funding
agencies. In 1966, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
brought two Tanzanian planners to visit American river-basin projects,
including the Grand Coulee Dam and the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Tanzania had both USAID and the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency
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of the Japanese Government (JETRO) study the hydropower potential of
Stiegler’s Gorge. Both agencies recommended the construction of the dam.
The Tanzanian government found a willing funding partner in the Nor-
wegian Agency for Development Cooperation.72 In August 1971, the Tanza-
nian government assigned the engineering firm Norconsult to produce yet
another feasibility study, one that would estimate costs and recommend
power-consuming industries for the region. In 1976, after completing these
studies, the Norwegian engineering firm Hafslund began work on the plans
for the Stiegler’s Gorge Dam.73
Concerned about the rapid pace of planning and the harm the dam
could do to downstream production systems, foreign and Tanzanian re-
searchers produced conflicting project reports and environmental-impact
assessments for the proposed dam.74 Between 1961 and 1984, over thirty
major studies of the Rufiji River and the potential ecological impact of the
Stiegler’s Gorge Dam circulated within Tanzania. Foreign consultants under-
took the bulk of these studies and recommended constructing the dam. An
interdisciplinary group of researchers—foreign and Tanzanian alike—at the
University of Dar es Salaam’s Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use
Planning (BRALUP) conducted numerous field studies of Rufiji agriculture,
political economy, and natural-resource use that emphasized the negative
effects of the dam.75 These researchers employed techniques that were a
combination of those used by their colonial and FAO predecessors: they con-
ducted extensive fieldwork, interviewed farmers and district officials, and
collected agronomic data using the most recent survey and scientific tech-
niques.76 They became, in a way, the voice of basin residents.
72. By the slowdown of planning efforts during the 1980s, Norway had given Tan-
zania over US$24 million to support the planning of the Stiegler’s Gorge project. For a
discussion of Norway’s aid industry, see Association for International Water and Foreign
Studies, “When Norway Dams the World, or Power Conflicts Report” (Oslo, 1994);
Michael Ngallapa, “Energy Development and Foreign Aid: The Case Study of Norway–
Tanzania Cooperation in the Planning of the Stiegler’s Gorge Hydropower Project,
1975–1985” (M.A. thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1985); and K. J. Havnevik et al.,
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78. The Akosombo Dam had led to the resettlement of over 80,000 people, exacer-
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80. Food and Agriculture Organization (n. 3 above), vol. 3, pt. 1, 137. A geological
discussion of both dam sites was presented in the additional geology survey volume by
By 1980, support for the Stiegler’s Gorge Dam was waning. Researchers
within Tanzania questioned the feasibility of the proposed design; others
emphasized the damage the dam could do to downstream environments
and production systems.77 The global public increasingly viewed large
dams as environmentally and socially destructive, and, as Ghana’s Akosom-
bo Dam had shown, economically and politically risky.78 In 1984, based on
the findings of a Norconsult study, the government halted planning for
Stiegler’s Gorge and refocused attention on smaller, less expensive hydro-
power projects in the upper basin.79
The Great Ruaha Power Project, 1966–1985
The story of the Great Ruaha Power Project allows us to see in greater
detail the kinds of challenges faced by international consultants, and the
ways that they created geographical knowledge in the face of those chal-
lenges. In 1970, at the height of enthusiasm for the Stiegler’s Gorge project,
representatives from Tanesco, the World Bank, and the Swedish Interna-
tional Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) agreed to construct the
Great Ruaha Power Project, which included the Kidatu hydropower plant
(first phase completed in 1975) and Mtera Reservoir (completed in 1980).
Like Stiegler’s Gorge, the Great Ruaha Power Project originated in the Rufi-
ji Basin Survey. M. Freimann, the project engineer of the RBS, had pro-
posed a hydroelectric reservoir and power plant at the Mtera site with a
capacity of 21 megawatts, and he identified the Kidatu site as a good loca-
tion for a storage reservoir for future projects.80
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81. Ingvar Jernelius and Lennart Samuelsson, “Tanzania Wami River Power Devel-
opment, Study of the Lower Wami for the Swedish International Development Author-
ity” (Stockholm, 1966), 1 (SWECO archive, Stockholm).
82. During November and December 1966, Fletcher had taken part in aWorld Bank
mission to investigate the East African power sector; see John Fletcher, “Report on Study
of Power Problems in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,” in SNASA, F1AB 1387.
83. SNASA, F1AB 1388, John Fletcher, “Klarälven,Wami and Great Ruaha—a Com-
parative Study of Three Rivers” (Munkfors, 1967), 18.
SIDA’s involvement in the project stemmed from a 1966 investigation of
a different project on the Wami River. During their investigations, SIDA
consultants learned about the competing Great Ruaha Power Project,
which had been proposed by Tanesco and a British consulting firm. In their
report on the Wami project, the engineers included a calculation for the
Ruaha project, basing their estimates on the data and interpretations of the
Rufiji Basin Survey. Due to time and budget limitations, they did not visit
the Great Ruaha River themselves.81 TheWorld Bank asked SIDA to finance
a study of the Great Ruaha Power Project, and in 1967 it contracted with
John Fletcher, a Swedish hydropower plant director, to research the upper
basin’s waterways and explore the feasibility of hydropower projects. With
limited data available and no funds to conduct field studies in Tanzania,
Fletcher opted to compare the Wami and the Great Ruaha to the regulated
Klar River in central Sweden, which at the time had records extending back
seventy-eight years.82
The task of predicting the flows of the Tanzanian rivers was compli-
cated. For the Klar, records showed small variations in stream flow over
long periods and between its lowest and highest monthly means. In com-
parison, Fletcher found that the available river-gauge readings for the Tan-
zanian rivers provided data that seemed either impossible or unlikely to
occur again. Stream flow for both rivers varied dramatically throughout a
single year (from no recorded flow to 1,000 cubic meters per second
[cumecs]), and also between years. The highest floods came the year after
the lowest mean was recorded. Fletcher’s experience of flow variations in
Swedish rivers, and the Klar in particular, simply did not compare to those
of the Great Ruaha. To Fletcher, the variations seemed faulty or were evi-
dence of extreme events that were unlikely to recur any time soon, and he
referred to the river as a “problem child.”83 To translate the data into forms
useful to engineers and planners, Fletcher chose to “smooth” the available
figures for the Tanzanian rivers:
It will be noticed that the year 1961/62 was exceptionally rich. This
fact leads to a distortion of the monthly means if calculated in the
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17 February 1968, to SIDA, K. H. Willén; letter from WD & ID, Lwegarulila—Ministry
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ordinary way. As such means will be used later on, some “smoothing”
has been done: the total amount of water in the average year . . . has
been distributed over the year in proportion to the monthly medians,
which can be more accurately assessed.84
The gauge readings of the two sites on the Great Ruaha River were so dif-
ferent that Fletcher chose to simplify by converting the two into a single
mean that he dubbed the “Great Ruaha Substitute.”
Fletcher’s process was meant to supply adequate data on which to base
his calculations, yet he was hesitant about its accuracy, noting that it was
“perhaps not absolutely flawless, but it will serve.”85 Without the data he
needed and no funding for further investigation of the sites, he concluded
that “accuracy and reliability are not what we should have liked them to
be,” but he maintained that enough information existed to go ahead with
planning for future dam construction on either the Great Ruaha or Wami
river.86
Following Fletcher’s report, the Tanzanian government requested fund-
ing for the Wami project from SIDA, which agreed, provided that a com-
parative study of theWami and Great Ruaha projects be conducted prior to
committing more funds.87 Heavy rains delayed and reduced the scope of
the resultant work. Geological field studies to find suitable conditions for
the construction of tunnels for the power plant were made during a two-
week visit in 1968. Tanzania’s water department took extra water-flow
measurements, but consultants conducted no further hydrological field
studies. Consultants from the Swedish engineering firm SWECO noted
that the data were incomplete and left many unanswered questions. Despite
this, the SWECO representative favored the Great Ruaha Power Project, cit-
ing “further considerations.”88 There is no evidence of what these consid-
erations were, although the project’s main funder (World Bank) and plan-
ners (Balfour, Beatty, and Co. Ltd. and Tanesco) supported the project. This
was enough. In 1968, SIDA commissioned a study of the technical and eco-
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nomic feasibility of the Great Ruaha Power Project, to be produced within
a year.89
Pressured by the short period allocated for the study, SWECO consult-
ants relied heavily upon the FAO’s Rufiji Basin Survey. Erling Reinius, a
Swedish hydrologist and professor of hydraulics, was given only ten days
for field studies of the Great Ruaha River.90 During his stay at the Kidatu
and Mtera sites, Reinius photographed the sites, measured water flows, and
checked the previously installed gauging instruments (fig. 2), recognizing
in the process the inadequacy of earlier records. After interviewing resi-
dents, he realized that measurements had been left out during some floods;
in some cases, he could not ascertain where the measurements had been
made. He also observed that some gauges were leaning. Despite these inad-
equacies, Reinius finalized the study. A year-and-a-half later, construction
began on the Kidatu site.91
FIG. 2 River gauge, probably by the Great Ruaha River, January 1969. (Photo by
Erling Reinius, reproduced courtesy of Ulla Reinius.)
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As the Great Ruaha Power Project moved forward, opposition to the
reservoir at Mtera arose. SWECO engineers had raised the issue of the local
population’s land and water rights with Tanzanian planners. Planners at the
central planning authority, DEVPLAN, dismissed these concerns, noting
that regional authorities would handle the relocation of people as part of
the ongoing ujamaa program.92 In 1972, A. Buchanan, a senior executive
engineer at the Tanzanian Ministry of Water Development and Power,
wrote to DEVPLAN: “With its almost complete draw-down and conse-
quent wide muddy shoreline, Mtera reservoir will be of little or no use for
fisheries, for settlement or for watering animals, stock or game. Except very
occasionally when full, the dam will not even be attractive to look at.”93
Buchanan’s objections had little effect. In 1974, he wrote to Tanesco’s gen-
eral manager to further emphasize the problems with the Mtera Reservoir,
suggesting as an alternative that dams be built at both Utengule and Iringa,
which in the case of Utengule would flood only permanent swamps and a
“virtually uninhabited” area.94 Despite this opposition and the shortage of
adequate scientific data, the Tanzanian government approved the construc-
tion of the Mtera Dam. It took less than a decade after reaching the full sup-
ply level before the doubts regarding water flows proved correct. Beginning
in 1993, the Great Ruaha River began to dry up completely during the dry
season, resulting in the loss of water to the Mtera Dam, power shortages in
the national electricity grid, and power rationing in Dar es Salaam.95
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“As systemic knowledge grows, so does the possibility of ignorance.”
—Mark Hobart96
The waters of the Rufiji Basin have incited the imagination of foreign
visitors since the late nineteenth century. During the colonial period, the
desire to increase agricultural production brought colonial engineers to the
region. The surveys they produced evidence their sensitivity to local re-
source use and their recognition of the expense and challenges of control-
ling the basin’s rivers. Following World War II, the colonial and independ-
ent Tanzanian governments invited international agencies to conduct
studies of the basin’s largest rivers and recommend a course of develop-
ment. Disconnected from the local experiences and having limited hydro-
logical data, these studies replaced previous geographical knowledge of the
basin. With the publication of each survey, certain assumptions about the
basin’s development remained constant: most of the technical experts in-
volved viewed hydropower dams as the best use of the region’s waterways.
Throughout this process, residents were excluded from discussions of the
region’s development priorities and dam projects. Their voices were not
entirely absent, however, as some researchers embraced the methods of the
colonial engineers, completing detailed studies that promoted the interests
of residents.
The case of the Rufiji Basin is not simply another example of inappro-
priate or failed development, but one that illustrates how the process of
development planning has affected the creation of geographical knowledge
in Africa. The new development science of the 1940s and the institutions it
spawned were based on a faith that Western science and technology could
transform less-developed nations into modern economies. As adherents of
this doctrine, the many experts who entered the basin came with a wealth
of expertise and the latest technology to assist them in their work. But they
found themselves more constrained than their colonial predecessors. The
pressure to produce quantitative data and concrete structures exposed the
tensions between the priorities of development and state institutions and
those of engineers and scientists. Political pressures and competition be-
tween funding agencies pushed engineers to complete their tasks quickly
and hindered their efforts to collect data on the basin’s waterways. They
completed their assignments as best they could, dutifully presenting their
findings in forms accessible to other technical experts. Even when engineers
questioned the data contained in the many charts, tables, and graphs, deci-
sion makers tended to trust it more than the narrative surveys of colonial
engineers. By illustrating the power of international institutions and gov-
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ernments to choose what is accepted as knowledge, as well as how such
knowledge is used, the case suggests the need to historicize studies of Afri-
can environments. Understanding the context within which such informa-
tion is created and passed on allows scholars and policy makers to interro-
gate assumptions about African environments and resource use, while
assisting engineers in planning socially and environmentally appropriate
projects.
In Tanzania, the assumptions of the FAO’s Rufiji Basin Survey continue
to affect the lives of millions of people. Influenced by bilateral and multilat-
eral funders and the global trend toward large dams, Tanzania predicated its
energy sector on the construction of hydropower dams, thus setting the stage
for its recent electricity crisis. With drought, increased water use, and biodi-
versity concerns threatening the production of hydroelectricity, Tanzania has
been forced to institute power-rationing schedules and seek ways to increase
electricity production.97 Within this context, dam boosters have reemerged.
The website for the Rufiji Basin Development Authority prominently dis-
plays a drawing of the Stiegler’s Gorge Dam, claiming the project “will sup-
ply abundant and reliable energy and will stimulated [sic] multiple develop-
ments in other sectors.”98 It also suggests that the project has been studied in
detail, implying that all that is needed is the funding. Moreover, the focus on
large-scale hydropower projects—another legacy of the FAO’s study—has
decreased funding of rural electrification projects, leaving most rural Tanza-
nians without reliable electricity.
Since the 1980s, international institutions like the World Bank have
come under increasing criticism for the environmental and social impacts
of their projects. This has led to a renewed interest in understanding and
incorporating local knowledge and perspectives into development plan-
ning, implementation, and evaluation. But there remains a tendency to
downplay the importance of a region’s environmental history in the devel-
opment-planning process. As the proposed hydropower projects would
impact their livelihoods and environments, it is important that residents
participate in discussions of future dams and development initiatives. Only
by incorporating multiple types of knowledge, valuing past experience, and
understanding the power dynamics within and between development insti-
tutions will planners avoid costly mistakes and better address local and
national needs.
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